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ABSTRACT
 
This study is directed towards the effects of bank lending, delinquencies, and 
other economic shocks on the performance of economic activity. I estimate the 
effect of these factors on employment, payrolls, and number of firms by firm size 
in the United States. Addressing conditions within the realm of small banks, one 
conclusion is that banks increase their total supply of bank credit after a reduction 
in capital levels. A number of former studies arrive at this conclusion, and this 
paper applies that hypothesis to more recent data. A common theme in related 
literature is that a "credit crunch" causes particular stress on small businesses 
because of their heavy reliance on external financing, which is mainly provided 
by small "community" banks. Small banks have historically been thought to have 
special ties to small businesses, but with the consolidation of banks over recent 
years, this study suggests that relationship between small banks and small 
businesses has declined. Using data for banks with assets under $300 million from 
2001-2005, this study reveals ways in which real activity is affected by variations 
in bank credit conditions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a cyclical economy, it is no surprise that the Federal government's recent 
decisions to cut interest rates are reminiscent of the cuts announced during the Savings 
and Loans Institutions crisis in the early 1990s. The Fed's intervention is aimed at 
mitigating the economic downturn; however, historical data warns against relying on 
such an easy fix. Analysts covering the S&L crisis determined that it would take twelve 
to eighteen months for changes in interest rates to have much effect on the economy 
(Buttonwood, 2007), and conservative analysts today share a similar view warning that 
recent cuts will not magically cure and immediately reverse economic conditions. 
A number of studies conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s provide considerable 
insight into today's economic struggles and those ofthe 2001 recession. Hancock and 
Wilcox (1998) researched changes in the availability of credit to small businesses during 
the credit crunch of the early 1990s. Results confirmed that real economic activity shrank 
more for small businesses than for large businesses, and the per-dollar effect of capital 
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losses at small banks was larger than for large banks. Kayshap and Stein (2000) also 
focused on small banks' activity with an examination of lending behavior between 1976 
and 1993. They concluded that small banks' lending channels are the most impacted by 
changes in monetary policy. Ariccia, et. aI. (2006) considered sector dependence on 
external sources of finance when studying the banking industry's ability to hinder real 
economic activity. Results substantiated the hypotheses that industries more dependent 
on external sources of finance are hurt more severely after a banking crisis and that 
banking crises must have an independent negative effect on real economic activity. 
The implications of these findings on my study are as follows: Local/regional 
businesses tend to be small and highly reliant on external financing which, according to 
Ariccia, et. aI., means that these businesses should see declines in growth during banking 
crises. My study posits that conditions at local and regional banks have significant impact 
on regional economic activity because local banks are involved in more small business 
lending than larger national and international banks. Thus, small banks should have a 
highly statistically significant impact on economic activity. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. Section II explores the 
credit crunch of the early 1990s and relates economic conditions then to those of the 
current crisis. Section III discusses a number or relevant studies and assesses existing 
evidence as it related to my hypothesis. Section IV presents the model of bank loans and 
real economic activity. Section V describes the data. Section VI outlines the results and 
Section VII concludes. 
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II. BACKGROUND
 
The Savings and Loans crisis occurred with the cessation of the housing boom 
experienced throughout the 1980s. When the market went bust, prices fell in real terms 
by 20% from 1989-1996 (Gross, 2007). In addition, the median price of a new home 
dropped 2.4% between 1990 and 1992 (Hill, 2006). This time around, the bust in the 
housing market is expected to be much worse since it follows an even greater boom. A 
huge overhang of unsold home inventory will persist into 2008, with sellers spending an 
average of 10 months on the market (Ostroff, 2007). Analysts note this as an ominous 
sign for the rest of the economy since there has not been this much slack in the market 
since the slump and recession of 1990. 
In the mid-I970s, S&Ls held 60% of the mortgage market while commercial 
banks held virtually nothing (Knowledge, 2007). Since that time, the banking industry 
has experienced multiple regulatory overhauls and consolidations resulting in mortgage 
market holdings of 10% for S&Ls and over 40% for commercial banks. Just as mortgage 
defaults in the late 1980s led to the S&L crisis in the early 1990s, current sub-prime 
defaults are arguably cause of tensions in the commercial banking industry. 
In the late 1970s, interest rates soared and the yield curve became inverted 
(Knowledge, 2007). Over time, S&Ls feared insolvency because they were paying more 
for borrowed money than they received on long-term, fixed-rate loans. In response, the 
government lifted its ban on adjustable rate mortgages in the early Eighties. Under the 
Carter administration, S&L rules loosened to allow for a much broader range of lending 
(Ellis, 2007). First S&L practices became akin to banking activities, then products and 
services extended beyond. The FDIC increased coverage from $40,000 to $100,000, 
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which in effect allowed for greater risk taking by S&L Institutions. The resulting 
overextension contributed to the 1990s recession in a number of ways, particularly by 
distorting investments, creating a credit crunch, and widening the already huge federal 
deficit. 
The current sub-prime crisis is often compared to the events leading to the S&L 
crisis. From loose regulations and moral hazard to a busting housing market and 
onslaught of mortgage defaults, the stage is set for a repeat of the past. To give a brief 
history, the resolution ofthe 1990s crisis spurred consolidation of segmented banks into 
mutli-product financial institutions, and the Financial Service industry was born 
(Trumbell, 2007). With such overlapping this time around, the sub-prime debacle is 
expected to have an impact that reverberates beyond a bank credit crunch to affect bond 
trading volumes and the issuance of asset backed securities such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) and commercial or residential mortgage backed securities (CMBS & 
RMBS) (Ellis, 2007). In 1990, less than 50% of mortgages were secured and sold to 
investors (Hill, 2006). Today approximately 70% are funded in the secondary market. 
Rather than applying credit standards designed to maintain the soundness of the banking 
system, brokers began eliminating old rules and moved largely into the business of 
matching borrowers to investors willing to take increasing risk. Furthermore, US banks 
are now reporting the biggest jump in delinquent loans in 16 years, and we sit at the 
biggest quarterly increase in the share of past-due loans (10.6% in 2Q2007) since the end 
of 1990 (Kirchoff, 2007). A 4Q2007 survey of senior loan officers revealed that 19.2% 
were tightening lending standards across product lines. This was up from 8.5% three 
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months prior and 0% one-year prior. Standards are arguably at their most stringent level 
since mid 1991. 
The 1990' s crisis saw a $150B industry loss, mainly borne by taxpayers. The 
government intervened, and the $7 Trillion economy was stabilized by the $300 Billion 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) (Morgenson, 2007). The RTC was a US 
government-owned asset management company mandated to liquidate assets (primarily 
real estate-related assets, including mortgage loans) that had been assets of S&Ls. The 
current economy, at $11 Trillion, is seeing $2 Trillion in market capitalization going 
away (as of August 2007), and again the government is stepping in with funding. 
However, the contemporary practice of spreading risk beyond the banking system makes 
fixing this mess much more difficult, and federal interest rate easing can only do so much 
to help the housing market. Analysts expect the repair cycle to take much longer than it 
did in the nineties because the crisis is not concentrated to the banking system. Losses to 
commercial and investment banks are not yet pulling down taxpayers, but according to 
some economists, the threat to Wall Street profits will prove especially detrimental to the 
economy over time. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most attribute the initial deterioration oftoday's credit conditions to the crash in 
the real estate sector, and many studies of prior credit crunches address real estate issues 
as well. Hancock and Wilcox (1993) hypothesized that the flow of bank credit in the 
1990s slowed considerably as a result of problems in the real estate sector, but only 
minimally by the sluggishness of the macroeconomy. They note that from 1982-1989, the 
dollar volume of banks loans was increasing 8% annually, but that rate fell to 4.5% in 
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1990 and then declined further in 1991. The study first compares the relationship between 
bank credit and overall economic activity for the period 1959-1992 confirming that bank 
credit is procyclical: bank credit and economic activities generally rise and fall together. 
The study next questions if credit flows are impacted by a downward revision in 
the value of real estate collateral. If so, then business lending collateralized by real estate 
would be inhibited in addition to lending for real estate development and construction. 
Analyses of bank reactions to the S&L crisis reveal that many banks shrank balance 
sheets outright-particularly in business loan-and the shortage in equity capital 
resulting from defaults, smaller balance sheets, and huge LLPs limited banks' ability to 
make any type of loan. 
In fact, data reveals that the volume of delinquent C&I loans had no detectable 
effect on bank lending while the volume of delinquent real estate loans significantly 
affect the flow of total bank credit: For every extra dollar of delinquent real estate loans 
in 1989, total credit flow shrank just over two dollars in 1990. The study concludes that 
increased delinquencies in any type of real estate loan deter both commercial and single 
family real estate lending. Further, a one-dollar shortfall in capital, as measured by a 
regulatory variable, leads to a fifty-cent decline in commercial real estate loans. As far as 
single-family real estate lending, the flow of residential mortgages dropped by an 
estimated fifty-seven cents for each one-dollar capital fell short of targets. Hancock and 
Wilcox conclude that these conditions trump the impact of macroeconomic conditions, 
and were key drivers of the 1990 recession. 
Hancock and Wilcox (1994b) also explore the impact of capital shortfalls on asset 
composition hypothesizing that shortfalls resulting from loan delinquencies cause shifts 
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to low-risk assets such as securities and away from higher risk assets such as commercial 
real estate and commercial and industrial loans. Results contradict the hypotheses and 
reveal that capital shortfalls have no significant impact on C&I lending and in fact are 
associated with a rise in commercial real estate lending. Conclusions suggest that capital 
shortfalls due to loan delinquencies do not impair business lending. 
A study conducted by Hoggarth, et. al. (2002) considers ways in which banking 
crises impose costs on the broader economy, speculating that under certain conditions, 
banking crises may reduce credit, income, and wealth in the economy as a whole. 
Particular attention is paid to households and small businesses, which face the most 
difficulty in obtaining alternative financing from the securities markets. The critical issue 
considered is whether banking crises cause reductions in output, or vice versa. Since 
banking crises often occur during business cycle downturns, this study attempts to 
separate declines in output due to crises from those due to cyclical downturns. Results are 
that cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are roughly 15-20%, on 
average, of annual GDP. 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006) devises a study to address the aftermath of banking crises 
using both aggregate and bank-level data. The study also seeks to answer the question of 
whether or not bank distress propagates adverse economic shocks, thereby prolonging 
recessions. A sample of 36 crises in 25 countries reveals that banking crises are in fact 
accompanied by a sharp decline in output growth. Further, growth remains depressed in 
the year following the crisis, but returns to its pre-crisis level thereafter. Thus, the study 
concludes that while financial distress wreaks havoc in the banking system and takes 
many years to clean up, the effects on the real economy seem to be short-lived. Another 
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key finding is that credit as a share of GDP remains significantly above pre-crisis levels 
for the entire aftermath period, indicating that credit slows down less rapidly than output. 
In other words, credit growth remains depressed longer than output growth. A major 
implication of this study is the assumption that banking crises cause downturns in 
economic growth. This one-way causation is not highly substantiated, but the results 
provide some optimism in light of current economic conditions. 
Kaminsky, et. al. (1999) pose findings that conflict with the previous study, 
suggesting that there is dual causation between banking crises and real economic activity. 
Results show that crises are typically preceded by a multitude of weak and deteriorating 
economic fundamentals, and the incidence of crises where the economic fundamentals 
were sound is rare. One of the most interesting findings is that, up to about 8 months 
before the banking crises, the average economy was recording rapid growth rates above 
those observed during tranquil periods. Further, results appear to suggest that the majority 
of crises have a multitude of weak economic fundamentals at their core. When considered 
in light of similar studies, the causation question between banking crises and downturns 
in economic activity remains unresolved. 
Braun and Larrain (2004) conduct a similar study in an attempt to establish that 
causality goes effectively from financial to economic development and not the other way 
around. The main hypothesis is that recessions should have a larger impact on industries 
with higher external dependence since capital markets are imperfect. Secondly, as 
fiictions increase, the difference between highly dependent industries and less dependent 
ones should be larger. Results confirm the hypotheses. Recessions are associated with a 
4.7% decrease in growth for the typical industry, and the highly dependent (85th 
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percentile) industries experienced a 0.9% larger drop than those industries with little 
dependence (lsth percentile). In terms of causation, Braun and Larrain argue the business 
cycles are largely dependent on the condition of the credit channel and that this 
dependence is a widespread phenomenon across countries. 
A study conducted by Kashyap and Stein (2000) considers federal reactions to 
crises in the financial sector and finds that small banks' lending channels are the most 
impacted by changes in monetary policy. Their study examines lending behavior at the 
individual bank level using quarterly data from Call Reports 1976Ql-1993Q2. A pattern 
in the data reveals that on the asset side, small banks hold more in the way of securities, 
and make fewer loans, and on the liability side, are financed almost exclusively with 
deposits and common equity. Findings conclude that one year after a shock to the federal 
funds rate, the total C&I lending of all small banks is 0.41 % lower than it would be if 
these small banks did not face liquidity constraints. Thus, within the class of small banks, 
changes in monetary policy matter most for the lending of those banks with the least 
liquid balance sheets. An implication to consider here is whether the Fed would be best 
suited to assist banks with assets less than $300 million when combating slumping 
economic conditions. 
A recent study by Ariccia, et. al. (2006) expands upon previous studies and 
provides evidence that sectors most dependent on external sources of finance perform 
worse during banking crises; therefore, distress in the banking industry does hinder real 
economic activity. The main hypothesis is that if industries more dependent on external 
finance are hurt more severely after a banking crisis, then it is likely that banking crises 
have an independent negative effect on real economic activity. Results reveal that the 
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most financially dependent sectors (those in the 4th quartile of the dependence 
distribution) lost an additional 1 percentage point of growth in each crisis year compared 
to less financially dependent sectors. 
To reiterate, the implication of these findings on my study is that they provide 
insight into the relationship between small banks and economic activity. Small to mid­
size local/regional businesses are most reliant on external financing which, according to 
Ariccia, et. aI., means that these businesses should experience significant declines in 
growth during a credit crunch. My study posits that conditions at local and regional banks 
have significant impact on economic activity because local banks are involved in more 
small business lending than larger national and international banks. Thus, the relationship 
between small banks and economic activity should be statistically and economically 
significant. 
Another study conducted by Hancock and Wilcox (1998) revisits the credit 
crunch of the early 1990s, this time exploring the availability of credit to small businesses 
in particular. The paper presents estimates ofhow much bank loans and real economic 
activity in small businesses respond to changes in banks' capital conditions, lending, and 
aggregate economic conditions. The study reveals that small banks shrink their loan 
portfolios considerably in response to declines in their own capital, and real economic 
activity is significantly reduced by capital declines and loan declines at small banks. My 
study will seek to derive the same conclusions, with particular attention to the 2001 credit 
cnsls. 
Results also suggest that real economic activity in small businesses shrinks 
relative to that of large businesses in the years surrounding 1990 (Hancock and Wilcox, 
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1998). From 1989-1992, employment, payrolls, and the number of firms grew more 
slowly for businesses with less than 500 employees than at large businesses. The study 
concludes by noting that while large banks suffered the largest capital depletions during 
this time period, the per-dollar effect of capital losses at small banks was larger. 
Furthermore, gross state product declined more in response to capital losses at small 
banks than in response to large bank losses, which provides insight into the hypothesis 
that small banks make more "high-powered loans" and playa more crucial role in 
regional economic stability. In my study I also explore the relationships between small 
bank conditions, small businesses, and economic activity, but for the years 2001-2005 
and only for banks with asset holdings less than or equal to $300 million. 
Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A show real economic activity in small businesses 
relative to that of larger businesses. During 1997 to 2005, the number of firms, 
employment, and payrolls (as a percent of the total) by firm size grew more slowly for 
businesses with less than 500 employees than they grew at business with greater than 500 
employees. Figures 1 and 2 also show that the larger classes of "small businesses" 
generally experienced the slowest growth in those measures of economic activity. 
Expanding upon the previous study, Hancock, Peek, & Wilcox (2007) conduct an 
extensive study with state-level data from 1990-2000 to explore a number of hypotheses. 
One question they seek to answer is: How much does lower bank capital and higher 
interest rates affect businesses of various sizes? Operating under the assumption that 
small businesses are more adversely affected by negative shocks in the banking sector 
than large businesses, Hancock, et. al. predict that "lower bank capital at small banks 
impinged more on small business than on large business." They extend their hypothesis 
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to assert that the small bank to small business relationship would be more significant than 
the large bank to large business relationship, in terms of affected real economic activity. 
Results reveal that when economic growth is slow or interest rates are high, the effects on 
small business of per unit change in bank capital, loan delinquencies, and SBA­
guaranteed loans were larger than mid-size and large banks' effects on mid-size and large 
businesses, respectively. These finding are consistent with those of Hancock and Wilcox 
(1998) and Kashyap and Stein (2000), which supports the position that smaller banks are 
more useful for understanding how banking conditions influence the macroeconomy. 
Drawing upon conclusions in the literature, my study is directed towards the 
effects of small bank lending activity, loan delinquencies, and other economic shocks on 
the performance of real economic activity. Real economic activity proxies include: 
number of firms, employment, payroll, and gross state product. Again, attention is paid to 
whether the relationship between lending and economic activity is positive, with 
particular focus on small businesses. Hancock and Wilcox (1998, 2007) found this 
association to be significant in 1991, and I expect to find confirming significance when 
analyzing more recent data. Small banks have historically been thought to have special 
ties to small businesses, and with the consolidation of the largest banks (and subsequent 
focus on relationships with the largest businesses) over recent years, I expect the 
relationship between small banks and small businesses to have increased. 
The next two sections describe the empirical models and the data. 
IV. MODELS OF BANK LOANS AND REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
The model of bank supply of credit, first presented by Hancock and Wilcox 
(1994a), is used as a basis for my model. The original model posits that the bank supply 
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of loans depends positively on the loan interest rate, negatively on perceived risks to the 
bank (delinquency rates), positively on other factors that raised expected returns on the 
loans (consumer sentiment), and positively on bank capital. Appendix B defines the 
variables and appendix C outlines the expected and resultant coefficients. 
My empirical model for bank loans borrows the explanatory variables used by 
Hancock and Wilcox (1998) in their revision and extension of the 1994a study. The 
model for bank loans includes the following explanatory variables: As indicators of risk 
to banks and borrowers, I include loan delinquency variables as well as two measures of 
economic conditions (consumer sentiment and the bank prime interest rate). Capital 
variables split by time period are also included, as they were in Hancock and Wilcox' 
studies. 
In the empirical model for real economic activity, I consider specifications that 
directly include measures of bank loans. Just as in Hancock and Wilcox (1994), I posit 
that demand for output depends positively and directly on the supply of bank loans. Also, 
demand for output is expected to depend positively on consumer sentiment and 
negatively on loan delinquency rates and the interest rate. Hancock and Wilcox (1998) 
explained the difficulty in putting structural interpretation on the reduced-form 
coefficients used to explain real economic activity because these variables had "direct 
effects on spending and the demand for credit as well as indirect effects that operated 
through the supply of bank credit." Using consumer sentiment as an example, it is 
possible that increased consumer sentiment reflects increase demand for output and thus 
more jobs, firms and payrolls. Also, it is likely to increase supply of bank credit because 
banks use it as an information variable. Therefore, the estimated coefficient on consumer 
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sentiment reflects dual positive influences on demand for output (Hancock & Wilcox, 
1998). See Appendix C. 
The first model explains the relationship between the dependent total loan ratio 
variable (total loans to total assets) and six independent variables: capital ratio, 
delinquency ratios for each loan category (CRE, C&I, Consumer), consumer sentiment 
index, and the bank prime interest rate. The same independent variables are also used to 
explain the ratios of CRE, C&I, and Consumer loans to total assets. 
LOAN_RATIO = a + ~1(CAPITAL_RATIO) + ~2(DQ_CRE) + ~3(DQ_CI) + 
~4(DQ_CONS) + ~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (1) 
CRE_RATIO= a + ~1(CAPITAL_RATIO) + ~2(DQ_CRE + ~3(DQ_CI) + 
~4(DQ_CONS) + ~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (2) 
CLRATIO = a + ~1(CAPITAL_RATIO) + ~2(DQ_CRE) + ~3(DQ_CI) + 
~4(DQ_CONS) + ~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (3) 
CONS_RATIO = a + ~1(CAPITAL_RATIO) + ~2(DQ_CRE) + ~3(DQ_CI) + 
~4(DQ_CONS) + ~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (4) 
In a second model, gross state product is the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include total loan ratio, delinquency ratios, consumer sentiment, and the bank 
prime interest rate. These independent variables are then tested against dependent firm 
data (employment, number of firms, and total payroll) to reveal the impact of said 
variables on small business activity. 
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GSP = a+ ~1(LOAN_RATIO)+ ~2(DQ_CRE) + ~3(DQ_CI) + ~4(DQ_CONS) + 
~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (5) 
Finn Data = a + ~1(LOAN_RATIO) + ~2(DQ_CRE) + ~3(DQ_CI) + ~4(DQ_CONS) 
+ ~5(CSI) + ~6(PRIME) + £ (6) 
V.DATA 
My data measures conditions at small commercial banks, real economic activity at 
finns of different sizes, and national economic conditions. Data is collected for the years 
2001 to 2005 and represents 50 states. Data on asset allocation, loan holdings, loan 
delinquencies, and capital positions of individual banks is gathered as well as data on 
national economic activity and on number of finns, employment, and payrolls, as a 
percent of the total, by size of finn. Data sources are included in Appendix D. 
V-I. Construction ofBank Data 
I obtain data for banks' dollar, book-value holdings of total assets, loans, and 
capital from Call Reports for the years 2001-2005. The sample consists of 
community/local banks, which are designated by asset holdings of $300 million or less 
(Hancock & Wilcox, 1994). I use $300 million as the cut-off because it is the standard set 
in Hancock and Wilcox's 1994, 1998, and 2007 papers. Total assets is subdivided into 
three categories. Group A includes cash, marketable securities, and federal funds. Group 
B includes loans and lease financing receivables. Group C includes trading assets, 
premises and fixed assets, other real estate owned, investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries and associated companies, customer liabilities to the bank on acceptances 
outstanding, intangible assets, and other. I remove banks with incomplete infonnation 
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and whose report of total assets (RCON 2170) differs by more than $10,000 from the 
summation of the three asset classes. A revision in the reporting of assets is also noted. 
From 2002 forward, federal funds is broken into two subgroups: federal funds sold and 
securities purchased under agreement to resell. Equity capital data also comes from the 
Call Reports and is the sum of perpetual preferred stock (including related surplus), 
common stockholders' equity, surplus, and undivided profits and capital reserves 
adjusted for net unrealized losses on marketable equity securities. 
Dollar, book value holdings of total loans and leases, net ofuneamed income, is 
also obtained. The value of total commercial real estate loans includes all loans secured 
by real estate: construction, land development, and other land loans; secured by farmland; 
secured by 1-4 family residential properties (revolving, open-end loans and close-ended 
loans secured by first or junior liens); secured by multifamily residential properties; and 
secured by non-farm residential properties. The value of total commercial and industrial 
loans is gathered, as well as consumer loans, which includes: loans to individuals for 
household, family and other personal expenditures; credit cards; other revolving credit 
plans; and other consumer loans. 
Loan delinquency data by bank is also collected by dollar, book-value holdings. 
Values for commercial real estate, commercial and industrial, and consumer loan 
delinquencies included those amounts for loans past due more than 30 days but still 
accruing interest and loans that are in non-accrual status. Loan delinquency ratios are the 
total loan delinquencies in each category divided by the total loans in each category. 
Bannos 17 
Appendix B defines the variables. Appendix E contains descriptive statistics of 
the data for each year, including the number of banks actually used in this study. Mean, 
median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values are calculated. 
V-II: Measure ofaggregate real economic activity. 
As measure of total economic activity, I used GSP (reported in 2000 dollars) for 
the years 2001-2005. I calculated the year-over-year growth rate for use in my study. This 
data is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, a division of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
The consumer sentiment index is used as a proxy of economic conditions. The 
index measures consumers' attitudes towards the economy, and is nonnalized to the value 
of 100. The index surveys people on their feelings about their individual financial 
situation, and the overall economy's situation in the present and in the future. CSI is 
published monthly by the University of Michigan, and December data was obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis' FRED® research tool. 
The nominal prime interest rate is the interest rate variable used. It is an indicator 
of monetary policy and overall economic conditions on a national level. Data is obtained 
from the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System. 
V-III: Measures ofsmall business activity 
I use the number of employees as the measure of the size of a business because 
the Small Business Association defines a small business as an "independently owned and 
operated finn with fewer than 500 employees." Data is obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau's Statistics ofU.S. Businesses for the years 2001-2005. Data from 2006 is not 
included because it won't be available until mid to late summer 2008. Reports are 
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generated on a cost reimbursement basis: all participating agencies must pay for the 
tabulations before they are made public. Results are presented for firms over 499 
employees (large businesses), and for three sizes of small businesses: firms with less than 
20 employees, 20-99 employees, and 100-499 employees. Figures 1 and 2 are calculated 
with national level data, although state level data is used in my regressions. Variables 
include data on the number of firms of each size category as a percent of the total number 
of firms, employment in each size category as a percent of total employment, and annual 
payrolls as a percent of the total payrolls for businesses, by year. 
Appendix E contains descriptive statistics for these variables. 
VI. RESULTS 
Appendix C includes the expected sign of each coefficient versus the actual sign. 
Appendix F includes the regression results: value of the coefficient, t-statistic, and 
significance. 
Table 1: Loan Ratios 
The expected sign for the relationship between the capital ratio and loan ratio is 
unknown, as there are two competing theories to explain this relationship. The "risk 
transformer"/ "risk absorption" view holds that higher capital improves banks' ability to 
absorb risk and hence their ability to create loans (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and 
Santomero, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2003). Alternatively, the "financial fragility" theory 
states that additional capital makes banks less fragile, which decreases a bank's incentive 
to commit to monitoring clients and in tum hampers the banks' ability to create loans 
(Gorton and Winton, 2000). Since small banks deal with more entrepreneurial-type small 
businesses, where close monitoring is important, the "financial fragility" effect is 
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strongest for small banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). 
O'Keefe (2006) provides an example ofthis negative relationship in his study of bank 
merger activity. He finds that target banks have, on average, a higher equity ratio than 
those of the acquirers. Merger targets tend to be small banks, and O'Keefe finds that in 
addition to the higher-than-average equity ratio, such target banks have a higher 
proportion of assets in cash balances and a lower proportion in loans. My results are also 
consistent with the financial fragility theory. Loans were increasing over my sample 
period, while the capital structure remained low and "fragile." This fragility is incentive 
for banks to commit to monitoring their borrowers, which led to an increase in loans 
relative to other assets. This confirms Berger and Bouwman's (2007) results linking 
capital to lending at small banks from 1993 to 2003. 
My results reveal the expected negative correlation between delinquency rates and 
three loan ratio categories (total loan, CRE loan, and C&I loan): increases in 
delinquencies are associated with declines in loan origination. However, my ratio of 
delinquency rates to the consumer loan ratio is positively correlated. There are a number 
of explanations for this result. First, banks may have continued lending to consumers 
despite delinquencies in each loan category because of the period of economic growth. 
Growth in spending and borrowing by the household sector created strong growth in 
consumer lending by U.S. banks after the 1991 recession when non-mortgage consumer 
debt was growing at double-digit rates (yellen, 1996). This rapid pace is not unusual for 
a period of economic expansion, and the period after 2001 was another expansionary 
period. Growth in credit card debt is a major component because increasing preference 
for credit cards over cash fuels growth in consumer loans despite delinquencies. Further, 
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large revenue earnings on consumer loans, relative to delinquency losses, may explain the 
positive correlation between delinquencies and consumer loans. Put another way, 
"lenders active in the credit card business are conscious of higher potential loss rates and 
expect returns that will fully absorb these losses and still provide an adequate profit 
margin" (Yellen, 1996). 
The sample's limitation to banks with $300 million in assets or less may also 
explain the positive correlation. Small banks focus on relationship banking, so even 
during periods of high delinquencies, consumer lending may not be depressed since these 
banks focus on maintaining long-term relationships. Finally, changes in bankruptcy laws 
may explain part of the correlation. Ifbanks expected the passage of the 2005 Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, they may have continued lending 
despite delinquencies under the belief that new laws would give them more rights in the 
collection of bad debts. 
As expected, all categories of loan supply were positively correlated with the 
prime rate and consumer sentiment index. 
Table 2: Economic Condition 
The resultant signs of the coefficients for the independent variables' effect on 
gross state product match those expected and derived from Hancock and Wilcox's 1998 
study. The only exception is that total loan ratio is not found to have a significant impact 
on GSP during 2001-2005. 
Results vary for the total loan ratio's relationship to the percentage number of 
firms across firm sizes. The expected coefficient is positive: increases in lending increase 
the number of firms of each size, as more are able to obtain debt financing. This positive 
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correlation holds true for finns with 500 or more employees. However, there is not a 
significant relationship between small bank lending and finns with 20-99 and 100-499 
employees. This could be due to the specifications of my bank sample. Finns with 20-499 
employees are likely to meet the lending standards required by mid and large banks 
(assets >$300 million). Such banks can offer more attractive, complex products than can 
small banks. As for businesses with less than 20 employees, the relationship between 
number of finns and loan ratio was significant and negative at the 1% level. This can be 
explained by the period of economic expansion following the 2001 recession: many small 
finns moved into the 20-99 employee category via growth or acquisition. In this case, 
increases in bank lending created growth in the economy, and the number of smallest 
finns as a percent of total finns fell as a result. 
Hancock and Wilcox found bank lending to be positively correlated to payrolls 
and employment; however, my results, when significant, were negatively correlated for 
all finns but those with 100-499 employees. Since my sample is restricted to community 
banks with assets less than $300 million, it is unlikely that large businesses (>499 
employees) use their services. Therefore, I do not emphasis the resulting negative, though 
significant, coefficients for the relationships between small bank lending and large finn 
payrolls and small- bank lending and large finn employment. 
The negative relationship between payrolls at finns with less than 100 employees 
and lending by banks with $300 million or less in assets must be addressed (loan ratio 
was not found to have a significant impact on employment at this finn size). This finding 
could be an issue of causation. As the smallest finns struggled to emerge from the 
recession in 2001, they may have first cut payrolls before turning to community banks for 
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financing. This would explain a decline in payrolls in conjunction with an increase in 
lending since these smallest firms tend to patronize community banks. The community 
banks' focus on "relationship" banking leads them to extend loans to less credit worthy 
customers while larger banks focus on formulaic lending. If these small businesses were 
struggling to remain alive, larger banks would have been disinclined to lend, leaving 
small firms with only community banks to tum to. 
Results for the relationship between delinquency ratios and economic activity as 
measured by businesses vary across the board. When relationships are significant, each 
delinquency category is positively cOlTelated with the percentage of firms with 20-99, 
100-499, and over 499 employees. Firm growth in these categories during an economic 
expansion is often fueled by the acquisition of smaller, struggling firms. For example, 
delinquent firms will merge or be acquired by other firms, causing an increase in the 
percent of firms in the next size category up despite an increase in delinquencies. 
Following this logic, the percent of smallest firms should decline as the acquisitions 
move 'down the ladder.' A negative COlTelation is in fact observed between delinquencies 
and the percentage of firms with less than 20 employees. Again, this is expected since 
small firms have few financing options and defaulting generally leads to bankruptcy or 
acquisition. 
As for employment and payrolls by firm size, my model reveals a negative 
cOlTelation with eRE delinquencies at the largest two firm categories. Though expected, I 
again do not emphasize these results since large firms are not likely to be small bank 
clients. My coefficient for the relationship between commercial real estate delinquencies 
and employmenUpayrolls is positive for firms with less than 20 employees. Here I 
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address causation. During the economic expansion and small firms' struggle to grow, 
increasing employment via competitive wages is one of the first steps management can 
take. However, if growth does not occur, these firms begin defaulting. Because of their 
small size, banks require that loans be backed by commercial real estate, and defaults are 
recognized as an increase in CRE delinquencies. 
When looking at consumer loan delinquencies, results are consistent with 
Hancock and Wilcox's negative correlation between delinquencies and 
employment/payrolls at firms with less than 20, 20-99, and 100-499 employees. 
Considering the causation issue once again, it is intuitive that increases in employment 
and payrolls would be associated with decreases in consumer delinquencies, and vice 
versa. As for firms with over 499 employees, however, consumer delinquencies and 
employment/payrolls are positively correlated. This discrepancy again may be due to my 
sample: small bank consumer delinquencies would not reliably relate to payrolls and 
employment growth at large firms since large firms bank with mid and large size banks. 
Though significant, the consumer sentiment variable had coefficients equal to 
zero in each equation, which demonstrates that CSI had a negligible economic impact 
during this period. As for costs of borrowing, businesses with fewer than 20 employees 
and 20-99 employees reveal negative correlations between prime rate and number of 
firms, employment, and payrolls. This confirms Hancock and Wilcox's results and 
suggests that an increase in the prime rate impedes growth of small businesses since they 
are highly reliant on debt financing. The dependent variables for firms with 100-499 and 
over 499 employees were positively correlated to the prime rate, but the coefficients were 
extremely low. The low coefficient suggests that the cost of borrowing played only a 
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minimal role in large firms decisions. This is most likely due to their access to other 
sources of capital, such as equity financing. As for the positive relationship, rising 
interest rates may have encouraged equity financing, which then facilitated growth in 
firms, employment, and payrolls during this expansionary period. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A number of studies demonstrate that declines in capital ratios, economic 
conditions, and increases in loan delinquencies help explain the declines in bank loans 
during the 1991 recessionary period. This study applies a model similar to Hancock and 
Wilcox's 1998 model to the 2001-2005 time period in effort to compare elements of 
period following the 2001 recession to findings from the period surrounding the 1991 
recession. This study also presents estimates of how economic activity at business of all 
sizes responded to changes in lending, delinquencies, and other economic conditions. 
Using data from 2001 to 2005 organized by state, I estimate the independent 
variables' effects on banks' commercial real estate, commercial and industrial, and 
consumer loans, as well as on gross state product and firms, employees, and payrolls by 
firm size, as percents of the totals. In relation to capital decreases at their own banks, 
small banks (defined as those with assets less than $300 million) experienced an increase 
in each lending category. Results suggest that small banks are subject to the "financial 
fragility" theory and increase loans to other assets when capital ratios decline. Not 
surprisingly, factors such as loan delinquency rates and macroeconomic conditions also 
affected banks' loan holdings, and the correlations matched findings from previous 
studies. 
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The results in Table 2 provide insight into the effect of small bank conditions on 
the economic activity of businesses. My study explores the hypothesis that small banks 
make more "high-powered loans" to see if small banks have a significant role in 
economic activity during the 2001-2005 period. I expected this relationship to be 
particularly strong between small banks and small businesses. 
While this may have been the case during the 1989-1992 period, my results 
suggest that small banks no longer have the same economic influence. An explanation for 
this result is that merger and acquisition activity has led to an influx in large banks at the 
expense of growth in the number of small banks. Thus, my small coefficients relating 
small banks to business activity suggests that banks with assets less than $300 million 
have a limited impact on greater economic conditions. 
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Appendix A: Economic Activity Employees 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
LOAN_RATIO Total loans and leases, net ofuneamed income, divided by total 
assets 
Total commercial real estate loans (all loans secured by real estate: 
construction, land development, and other land loans; secured by 
farmland; secured by 1-4 family residential properties (revolving, 
open-end loans and close-ended loans secured by first or junior 
liens); secured by multifamily residential properties; and secured 
by non-farm residential properties) divided by total assets 
CeRATIO Total commercial and industrial loans divided by total assets 
CONS_RATIO Total consumer loans (all loans to individuals for household, 
family and other personal expenditures; credit cards; other 
revolving credit plans; and other consumer loans) divided by total 
assets 
CAPITAL_RATIO The sum of perpetual preferred stock (including related surplus), 
common stockholders' equity, surplus, and undivided profits and 
capital reserves adjusted divided by total assets 
D<LCRE Delinquent commercial real estate loans defined as loans past due 
more than 30 days but still accruing interest and loans that were in 
non-accrual status divided by total commercial real estate loans 
D<LCI Delinquent commercial and industrial loans defined as loans past 
due more than 30 days but still accruing interest and loans that 
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D<LCONS 
CSI 
PRIME 
GSP 
FIRM_20 
were in non-accrual status divided by total commercial and 
industrial loans 
Delinquent consumer loans defined as loans past due more than 30 
days but still accruing interest and loans that were in non-accrual 
status divided by total consumer loans 
Consumer sentiment index as a proxy for business owners' and 
lenders' views about current and future economic conditions 
Nominal prime interest rate 
Gross State product reported in 2000 dollars 
Number of firms with less than 20 employees divided by total 
number of firms of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Number of firms with 20-99 employees divided by total number of 
firms of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Number of firms with 100-499 employees divided by total number 
of firms, calculated yearly 
Number of firms with over 499 employees divided by total number 
of firms of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Total number of employees employed by firms with less than 20 
employees divided by total number of employees for all firm sizes, 
calculated yearly 
Total number of employees employed by firms with 20-99 
employees divided by total number of employees for all firm sizes, 
calculated yearly 
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Total number of employees employed by firms with 100-499 
employees divided by total number of employees for all firm sizes, 
calculated yearly 
Total number of employees employed by firms with over 499 
employees divided by total number of employees for all firm sizes, 
calculated yearly 
Total payroll dollars of firms with less than 20 employees divided 
by total payroll dollars of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Total payroll dollars of firms with 20-99 employees divided by 
total payroll dollars of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Total payroll dollars of firms with 100-499 employees divided by 
total payroll dollars of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
Total payroll dollars of firms with over 499 employees divided by 
total payroll dollars of all firm sizes, calculated yearly 
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Appendix C: Expected Coefficients 
Table 1 Coefficients 
Total Loans 
Dependent Variables (Supply Side) 
CRE Loans C&I Loans Consumer Loans 
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual 
-I: l/l
CLl CLl
'0_ 
1:.0 
CLl ell 
0. ';: 
CLl ell
-g> 
Capital Ratio +/­ - +/­ - +/­ - +/­ -
Delinquency Ratios - - - - - - +/­ + 
CSI + + + + + + + -
Prime Rate + + + + + + + + 
Table 2 Coefficients 
Dependent Variables 
GSP Number of Firms Number of Employees Payroll 
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual 
-I: l/l
CLl CLl
'0_ 
1:.0 
CLl ell 
0. ';: 
CLl ell 
'0>I: 
Total Loan Ratio + NS + +/-/NS + +/­ + +/-
Delinauencv Ratios - - - +/-/NS - +/­ - +/­
CSI + + + +/NS + + + NS 
Prime Rate - - - -/NS - +/­ - +/­
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Appendix D: Data Sources 
r----­
lVariable Source Web Address 
Bank Level 
!Data FDIC Call Reports, FFIEC-041 
htto://www.fdic.Clov/reaulations/resources/call/caI12.html 
!Finn Level 
Data 
US Census Bureau, Statistics of 
US Businesses htto://www.census.aov/csd/susb/susb.htm 
Kisp US Department of Commerce, US Bureau of Economic Analysis htto://wwW.bea.Clov/reaional/index.htm#asp 
Consumer 
Sentiment 
!Data 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Economic Data-FRED® htto://research. stlouisfed.ora/fred2/ 
Interest Rates Board of Governors of the Federal http://www.federalreserve. aov/econresdata/defauIt.htm 
lData Reserve System 
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics 
Bank Data (ratio ofloan type to total assets, ratio ofdelinquencies to total ofloan type) 
Statistics 
LOAN RATIO CRE RATIO CI RATIO CONS RATIO 
CAPITAL_RAT 
10 DO CRE DO CI DO CONS 
N Valid 33494 33494 33494 33494 33494 33324 32810 33244 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 170 684 250 
Mean 
.621548 .401145 .096457 .062856 .112790 .023065 .032207 .030715 
Median 
.639800 .398850 .079200 .048200 .098150 .015200 .012800 .022100 
Std. Deviation 
.1606415 .1729842 .0758891 .0649235 .0643935 .0277790 .0577405 .0383076 
Minimum 
.0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 -.0007 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum 1.2073 .9649 .9386 1.1724 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Average Ratios 
0.7000 1 I 
__ ='.__ .L= .. . •0.6000
 
r 0.5000
 j --+- Loan Ratio 
0.4000 . Capital Ratio o 
~ 0.3000
 
0.2000
 
0.1000
 
II: 
O.OOOO·! ~ I 2004 II 2005 I
______~2_0_0_1_11--2002 2003
 
,--+-Loan Ratio 10.6165 I 0:6164 0.6132 0.6277 I 0.6351
 
I--­
.......- Capital Ratio I 0.1103 ' 0.1103 0.1103 0.1103 10.1103
 
L ' , J 
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Economic Data 
Statistics 
PRIME CSI GSP 
N Valid 33494 33494 33494 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 5.2457 91.324 2.1695 
Median 4.6700 91.500 2.0500 
Std. Deviation 1.11115 3.5899 1.68582 
Minimum 4.12 86.7 -4.70 
Maximum 6.91 97.1 9.26 
Consumer Sentiment 
980 1 
96.0 j 
94.0 I 
... 1 
92.0 1 
90.0 I 
88.0 
86.0 
-+-- Qxlsurrer Sentirrenl 
h<Iex 
84.0 
82.0 
800 I 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
I 
Firms by Firm Size (number offirms in each category as a percent oftotal) 
Statistics 
FIRM 20 FIRM 20 99 FIRM 99 499 FIRM 499 
N 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Valid 
Missing 
33494 
0 
.862829 
.861200 
.0129558 
.7447 
.9106 
33494 
0 
.093150 
.094400 
.0081796 
.0645 
.1302 
33494 
0 
.021964 
.022400 
.0024937 
.0132 
.0550 
33494 
0 
.022058 
.021600 
.0070889 
.0078 
.0707 
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Employees by Firm Size (number ofemployees in each category as a percent oftotal) 
Statistics 
EE 20 EE 20 99 EE 99 499 EE 499 
N Valid 
Missing 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
33494 
0 
.184681 
.180000 
.0240060 
.1232 
.3279 
33494 
0 
.180223 
.179900 
.0145795 
.1453 
.2398 
33494 
0 
.145609 
.146700 
.0121314 
.1157 
.1992 
33494 
0 
.489480 
.494600 
.0425786 
.2864 
.5711 
Payroll by Firm Size (payroll dollars in each category as percent oftotal) 
Statistics 
PAY 20 PAY 20 99 PAY 99 499 PAY 499 
N Valid 
Missing 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
33494 
0 
.155987 
.148900 
.0212075 
.1176 
.2866 
33494 
0 
.160055 
.160600 
.0135540 
.1345 
.2178 
33494 
0 
.138242 
.138600 
.0116772 
.1004 
.1897 
33494 
0 
.545648 
.553900 
.0394476 
.0322 
.6379 
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Appendix F: Results Tables 
Table 1: The effects on bank loans of bank capital, loan delinquencies, and economic conditions 
Dependent Variable (Loan Category) Explanatory Variables 
Bank Capital Ratio Loan Delinquency Rate Economic Conditions 
CRE C&I Consumer CSI Bank Prime Interest Rate 
Total Loans 
Beta -0.858 -0.538 -0.038 -0.071 0.001 0.004 
t-Statistic -51.916 -16.495 -2.475 -2.891 5.527 4.603 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.013 0.004 0.000 
Total CRE Ratio 
Beta -0.697 -0.757 -0.102 -0.206 0.003 0.001 
t-Sta tis tic -38.702 -21.281 -6.129 -7.741 11.833 1.049 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.294 
Total C&I Ratio 
Beta -0.102 -0.099 -0.063 -0.054 0.000 0.001 
t-Statistic -12.423 -6.124 -8.295 -4.437 -3.390 2.120 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.034 
Total Consumer Ratio 
Beta -0.078 0.224 0.027 0.155 -0.001 0.001 
t-Sta tis tic -13.021 18.897 4.908 17.492 -11.924 3.096 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
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Table 2: The effects on economic activity of total bank loans, loan delinquencies, and economic conditions 
Dependent Variable (Loan Category) Explanatory Variables 
, Total Bank Loan Ratio Loan Delinquency Rate Economic Conditions 
CRE C&I Consumer CSI Bank Prime Interest Rate 
GSP 
Beta -0,005 -2.007 -0.373 -1.457 0.149 -0.385 
t-Statistic -0.088 -6.199 -2.470 -6.031 59.737 -47.794 
Significance 0.930 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% Employment by Firm Size 
>499 Employees 
Beta -0.003 -0.027 -0.025 0.053 -0.001 0.001 
t-Statistic -1.775 -2.871 -5.771 7.492 -12.809 5.652 
Significance 0.076 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
100-499 Employees 
Beta 0.002 -0.007 0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.000 
t-Statistic 5.360 -2.748 6.015 -3.751 25.606 4.847 
Significance 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20-99 Employees 
Beta 0.000 0.015 0.009 -0.013 0.000 0.000 
t-Statistic 0.625 4.598 5.971 -5.488 10.585 -6.042 
Significance 0.532 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
<20 Employees 
Beta 0.000 0.020 0.009 -0.032 0.000 -0.001 
t-Statistic 0.104 3.676 3.583 -8.050 3.456 -8.709 
Significance 0.917 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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Table 2, Cont'd. 
Dependent Variable (Loan Category) Explanatory Variables 
Total Bank Loan Ratio Loan Delinquency Rate Economic Conditions 
CRE C&I Consumer CSI Bank Prime Interest Rate 
% of Firms by Firm Size 
>499 Employees 
Beta 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
t-Statistic 6.204 10.496 -0.007 3.091 -6.389 4.541 
Significance 0.000 0.00 0.939 0.002 0.000 0.000 
100-499 Em ployees 
Beta 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
t-Statistic 1.344 3.703 -1.881 8.035 -2.659 -3.940 
Significance 0.179 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.008 0.000 
20-99 Employees 
Beta 0.000 0.011 2.28E-05 0.011 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 
t-Statistic -1.089 6.08 0.027 8.104 -1 .467 -1 .406 
Significance 0.276 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.142 0.160 
<20 Employees 
Beta -0.001 -0.029 0.001 -0.018 0.000 O.OOE+OO 
t-Statistic -2.982 -10.292 0.394 -8.391 4.834 -0.837 
Significance 0.003 0.000 0.693 0.000 0.000 0.403 
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Table 2, Cont'd. 
Dependent Variable (Loan Category) Explanatory Variables 
--­
Total Bank Loan Ratio Loan Delinquency Rate Econom ic Conditions 
CRE C&I Consumer CSI Bank Prime Interest Rate 
% Real Payroll by Firm Size 
>499 Employees 
Beta -0.005 -0.024 -0.017 0.059 0.000 0.002 
t-Statistic -3.185 -2.754 -4.082 9.024 -2.779 7.242 
Significance 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
100-499 Em ployees 
Beta 0.004 -0.012 0.006 -0.011 0.000 0.000 
t-Sta tis tic 8.421 -4.598 5.327 -5.848 19.78 4.027 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20-99 Employees 
Beta -0.003 -0.018 0.007 -0.034 0.000 0.000 
t-Statistic -0.354 -4.274 1.098 -6.779 10.34 -8.272 
Significance 0.041 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 
<20 Employees 
Beta -0.001 0.017 0.004 -0.031 0.000 -0.001 
t-Statistic -1.915 3.643 2.01 -8.728 -5.459 -11.644 
Significance 0.056 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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